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PROTECTIONISM IN agricultural trade takes many forms from taxes and red tape at the border, 
to so-called non-tariff measures such as 
agricultural and food safety standards 
that exceed those recommended by 
international public health bodies. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
does not set standards but strongly 
encourages member countries to use 
internationally accepted science-based 
standards whenever available. The 
WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement promotes harmonization of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and alignment on international 
standards, in short, they encourage 
countries to use the same standards as 
one another in setting their country’s 
trade regulation to keep trade 
opportunities fair. The SPS agreement 
designates Codex Alimentarius, a joint 
body of the World Health Organization 
and the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, as the 
organization deϐining standards for food 
safety. The WTO allows its members 
to vary from the Codex standards for 
a product, as long as the standards in 
its place are science based (evidence of 
a risk from the regulated substance), 
non-discriminatory (similar products of 
all origins treated similarly), and least-
trade restrictive (no unnecessary trade 
impediments). Thus, a country that does 
not use the Codex standard to regulate 
its trade does not necessarily indicate 
protectionist motives, but the Codex 
standard provides an important baseline 
for assessing protectionist outcomes. 
This article reports on recent 
research completed on the potential 
protectionist effects of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides 
(and a few veterinary drugs) 
established by individual countries 
in global agricultural and food trade. 
Countries set the MRL for speciϐic 
pesticides or drugs and for speciϐic 
agricultural and food items. Countries 
also deϐine a set of default values 
which are used for pesticides or drugs 
that are not explicitly regulated as 
regulation trails behind new pesticide 
and drugs.
To provide insight into the 
potential for protectionist effects of 
the MRL standards set by countries, 
we designed and computed 
aggregated indices of protectionism 
for these MRLs based on the percent 
deviation of a country’s MRL from 
the Codex standard. The indices 
allow for aggregation over MRLs and 
commodities and comparison across 
agricultural products and countries. 
One important property of these 
measures is that the indices increase 
more than proportionally with 
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increasing protectionism in MRLs to 
reϐlect the increasing difϐiculty to meet 
more stringent standards.
For pairs of chemicals and 
agricultural products for which a Codex 
standard exists and a country’s MRL 
for that particular pair is set to be 
more stringent than the corresponding 
international standard, the index 
indicates protectionism (a value above 
1). Vice versa, lax standards are anti-
protectionist and the index value then 
falls below 1. The research did not 
consider MRLs for which Codex does 
not set an international standard, as the 
science is being established or risk may 
not exist.
The data used come from USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service. The 
database used values for 2012 and had 
19,486 pairs of pesticides and products 
for 83 countries with a total of over 
1.6 million records. The pesticide MRL 
data swamps the veterinary drug MRLs 
in coverage with only about 9,000 
veterinary drug records. In the analysis, 
the database is trimmed to about 
400,000 usable observations for 77 
countries by removing redundant data 
and observations without corresponding 
Codex standards. Here, we focus on 
pesticides as they drive results when 
using both pesticide and veterinary drug 
MRLs. We also limit the discussion to 
country level protectionism indices and 
refer the interested readers to our detail 
report for commodity level results.
Among the countries included 
in the data, 29 countries completely 
comply with Codex standards; 18 
countries comply with EU standards; 7 
countries defer to exporting countries 
standards; 5 countries comply with 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
standards; and Mexico adopted U.S. 
standards. Finally, 22 countries set 
their own standards only or have 
standards partially combined with 
Codex or EU standards.
The table summarizes results on 
each country’s protectionist indices. 
Australia, Japan, and Taiwan come out 
as the most protectionist countries. 
This is largely due to the fact that they 
have stringent default values for MRLs 
that they do not explicitly set (zero or 
near-zero tolerance when an MRL is 
not explicitly speciϐied) and because 
they have many non-established MRLs. 
In addition, Australia and Taiwan 
have stringent established MRLs. In 
contrast, Japan actually is slightly 
anti-protectionist (the index is below 
1) when computing the index solely 
using established MRLs. Russia and 
Brazil come out as systematically 
protectionist because of stringency 
on established MRLs but much less 
because of default MRLs which are 
lax. They have a large number of non-
established MRLs, which dilute the 
presence of the limited number of 
established MRLs and their associated 
protectionism.
The EU, Turkey, and Canada are 
also among protectionist countries 
because they have both tight default 
and established MRLs that are 
stricter than Codex. Interestingly, 
a few countries, including South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, and Albania have 
MRLs set much below Codex MRLs 
with the consequence of potentially 
under-protecting the health of their 
consumers from harmful residues.
None of these two measures 
provides a better measure of 
protectionism than the other. Rather 
they both shed light on two ways to 
be protectionist, one by actively over-
regulating speciϐic pesticides, and the 
other with a blanket policy that could be 
relaxed once a speciϐic MRL is issued for 
a formerly unregulated pesticide. 
The standard deviations of the 
indices  tend to be small (this data can 
be found in the full paper cited below.) 
The research did not unveil evidence 
of countries being non-protectionist 
“on average” by offsetting a few very 
protectionist MRLs or markets with 
anti-protectionist ones. This ϐinding 
is consistent with the observed small 
standard deviations across products 
within any country.
For further information and detail 
on the inquiry see Li, Yuan, and John 
C. Beghin “Protectionism Indices for 
Non-Tariff Measures: An Application to 
Maximum Residue Levels,” Economics 
department working paper No. 12013, 
2012. Forthcoming in Food Policy.  
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